Incentives for Collective Deviance: Group Size and Change and Perceived Risk, Cost, and Reward
Table of Contents
Changing Perceptions of Rewards, Informal Costs, and Sanction Risk 3
Current Study 5
Independent Variable 5
Dependent Variables 5
Method and Sample 6
Literature Review 7
Findings 7
Discussion 8
References 11
Incentives of Collection Deviance: Group Size and Change and Perceived Risk, Cost, and Reward
In their article, McGloin and Thomas (2016) discuss the incentives of deviant behavior within groups comparing it to individual decision-making. Previous research has outlined that individuals are less likely to make risky decisions when they are alone as opposed to when they are in a group (Diener et al., 1976; Gardner and Steinberg, 2005; Chein et al., 2011). The early research of collective behavior, such as studies by Freud (1960) and Le Bon (1960), considered this phenomenon to be a result of the collective consciousness. However, this view is determined by the authors of the article as unreliable, since research has highlighted considerable cognitive processes employed by people engaged in collective actions, even when it takes a form of criminal behavior. Accordingly, rational choice frameworks can be applied in order to explain collective behavior with its primary focus on examining the decision-making process, and how people decide to participate in collective action even when it contradicts their long-term goals and preferences.
Changing Perceptions of Rewards, Informal Costs, and Sanction Risk
Rewards are often discussed as incentives for collective behavior. These rewards are obtained by the individuals who participate in collective action but denied to those who refuses to cooperate (Olson, 1965; Oliver, 1980, 1984). The perceived rewards associated with deviant behavior are determined as central factors to cost-benefit approaches (McCarthy and Hagan, 2005). Although there is a significant distinction between reward perceptions and reward preference, the presence of peers is associated with a higher preference for rewards (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005; O’Brien et al., 2011). Reward preference relies on the weight placed by the individuals on the reward according to their subjective evaluation, while reward perceptions rely on the actual value of the anticipated rewards (McGloin & Thomas, 2016). Accordingly, the authors develop their first hypothesis, assuming that the rewards anticipated by the individuals as a result of a deviant act increase when the number of people engaged in the act increases as well.
As the size of a group engaged in collective deviance increases, perceived informal costs can change in two ways. Thus, the perceived informal costs associated with passivity may increase while the perceived informal costs related to action may decrease. The authors assume that individuals are more likely to feel themselves at risk for exclusion or ridicule and the perception of social pressure is higher when more people are engaged in the action. Therefore, according to the second hypothesis, it is assumed that the informal costs of not participating in the deviant act increases when the number of people engaged in the act increases. …
